Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown
increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of
scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular
disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area
was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive
and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally
addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action,
knowledge, and normativity.
Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function
suggest ways that “naturalistic” programs might develop in detail, beyond the
abstract philosophical considerations in their favor. The literature
distinguishes “philosophy of neuroscience” and “neurophilosophy.” The former
concerns foundational issues within the neurosciences. The latter concerns
application of neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions.
Exploring various concepts of representation employed in
neuroscientific theories is an example of the former. Examining implications of
neurological syndromes for the concept of a unified self is an example of the
latter. In this entry, we will assume this distinction and discuss examples of
both.
